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acknowledges that states may be able to invoke the 
national security exception in response to pandem-
ics such as COVID-19. However, the article contends 
that the invocation of the national security exception 
in this context may not actually be helpful to states 
that do not possess local manufacturing capacity. 
Furthermore, the article argues that the national se-
curity exception cannot be used to obviate the stric-
tures contained in Article 31bis of the TRIPS Agree-
ment. It is therefore doubtful whether the national 
security exception in the TRIPS Agreement is a realis-
tic option for states that do not possess local manu-
facturing capacity.
Abstract:  As a result of the COVID-19 pan-
demic, a number of scholars and commentators have 
suggested that states can invoke the national secu-
rity exception in Article 73(b)(iii) of the TRIPS Agree-
ment to enable the suspension of patent laws in or-
der to facilitate the production and importation of 
patented medicines and vaccines. This article there-
fore critically assesses the extent to which states can 
realistically invoke the national security exception in 
response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Drawing on two 
recent rulings by WTO Panels in both Russia – Traffic 
in Transit (2019) and Saudi Arabia – Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights (2020) where the nature and scope of the 
national security exception wasanalysed, the article 
A. Introduction
1 Article 73 of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement)1 provides for 
security exceptions that states can invoke to defend 
their non-compliance with the TRIPS Agreement. 
* Lecturer in International Intellectual Property Law, Edinburgh 
Law School, University of Edinburgh. Email: emmanuel.oke@
ed.ac.uk
1 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1C, April 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 3; 33 I.L.M. 
1197 (1994).
This is a unique provision in the context of 
international intellectual property law. Crucially, 
the major intellectual property treaties that were 
in existence before the TRIPS Agreement i.e. the 
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary 
and Artistic Works (Berne Convention)2 and the 
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property (Paris Convention)3 do not contain any 
security exceptions.
2 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works, 1886, as last revised at Paris in 1971 and as amended 
in 1979, 828 U.N.T.S. 221.
3 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 
1883, as last revised at Stockholm in 1967 and as amended in 




Article 73 of the TRIPS Agreement mirrors similar 
provisions in Article XXI of the WTO’s General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and Article XIV bis of the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and it 
provides that:
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed: 
(a) to require a Member to furnish any information the 
disclosure of which it considers contrary to its essential 
security interests; or 
(b) to prevent a Member from taking any action which 
it considers necessary for the protection of its essential 
security interests; 
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the 
materials from which they are derived;
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition 
and implements of war and to such traffic 
in other goods and materials as is carried 
on directly or indirectly for the purpose of 
supplying a military establishment; 
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in 
international relations; or 
(c) to prevent a Member from taking any action in 
pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations 
Charter for the maintenance of international peace and 
security.
2 The recognition of the need to permit states to be 
excluded from their obligations under the TRIPS 
Agreement in order to protect their essential 
security interests confirms the central role of the 
principle of territoriality in international trade law 
generally and in international intellectual property 
law specifically. This principle is connected to the 
concept of state sovereignty in international law 
and it is the foundational principle in international 
intellectual property law.4 Article 73 of the TRIPS 
4 See, Susy Frankel, ‘WTO Application of the Customary Rules 
of Interpretation of Public International Law to Intellectual 
Property’ (2006) 46(2) Virginia Journal of International Law 
365, 371 (noting that, “[d]espite the growth of intellectual 
property in international trade, intellectual property remains 
a territorial creature and an owner of an intellectual prop-
erty right must claim that right on a territory-by-territory 
basis.”). See also, Lydia Lundstedt, Territoriality in Intellectual 
Property Law (Stockholm University, 2016) 91; Hans Ullrich, 
‘TRIPS: Adequate Protection, Inadequate Trade, Adequate 
Competition Policy’ (1995) 4(1) Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal 
153, 159 (noting that, “…intellectual property, whether it is 
a patentable invention or a copyrightable work, is national 
by nature. Therefore, it must be acquired, maintained, and 
defended independently from one country to the other. In 
fact, the conditions governing the acquisition, existence, 
Agreement therefore reaffirms the ability of states 
to take steps to secure their sovereign interests even 
in the context of international intellectual property 
law.5
3 Nevertheless, the precise scope of these security 
exceptions has been unclear until very recently. 
Fortunately, Article XXI of the GATT and Article 73 
of the TRIPS Agreement have been considered and 
interpreted by two WTO dispute settlement panels.6 
Prior to these two decisions, a number of states took 
the view that these exceptions were “self-judging” 
and could not be subject to adjudication via the 
maintenance, validity, scope, and termination of intellectual 
property vary widely from one country to the other. The 
privilege granted to the owner of the intellectual property to 
exclusively exploit a right, extends to the entire territory of 
the state granting protection, but is also limited to this terri-
tory.”); Peter Yu, ‘A Spatial Critique of Intellectual Property 
Law and Policy’ (2017) 74(4) Washington & Lee Law Review 2045, 
2064 (stating that, “Territoriality is the bedrock principle of 
the intellectual property system, whether the protection 
concerns copyrights, patents, trademarks, or other forms of 
intellectual property rights. This principle not only carefully 
identifies the prescriptive jurisdiction, but also helps set 
boundaries for protection within and outside the country. 
Strongly supported by the principle of national sovereignty, 
the territoriality principle aims to address concerns about 
international comity.”).
5 See also, UNCTAD-ICTSD, Resource Book on TRIPS and Devel-
opment (CUP, 2005) 801 (noting that, “Although there is a 
relatively widespread tendency among scholars to perceive 
international trade law as a concept differing from the clas-
sical idea of state sovereignty and to regard national security, 
borders and territory as state interests difficult to reconcile 
with liberalization of markets, the provision of Article 73, 
almost identical to Article XXI of the GATT and Article XIV 
bis of the GATS, proves that these traditional state interests 
continue to be a major concern of WTO Members.”).
6 See, WTO, Russia – Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit, Panel 
Report, WT/DS512/R (5 April 2019) (interpreting Article XXI of 
the GATT); WTO, Saudi Arabia – Measures Concerning the Protection 
of Intellectual Property Rights, Panel Report, WT/DS567/R (16 
June 2020) (interpreting Article 73 of the TRIPS Agreement). 
It should be noted that Saudi Arabia has launched an appeal 
against this decision to the WTO’s Appellate Body. This means 
that the panel report in this case cannot be considered for 
adoption by the WTO’s dispute settlement body until the 
conclusion of the appeal. As the Appellate Body is currently 
non-functional due to disagreements among WTO members 
regarding the appointment of members to the Appellate Body, 
it is not yet clear as at the time of writing when this appeal 
will be resolved. See, WTO, Saudi Arabia – Measures Concerning 
the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, Notification of an 
Appeal by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, WT/DS567/7 (30 July 
2020).
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WTO dispute settlement system.7 In this regard, it is 
worth noting that the most relevant exception in the 
context of pandemics is the one contained in Article 
73(b)(iii) of the TRIPS Agreement which permits a 
state to take “any action which it considers necessary 
for the protection of its essential security interests” 
during the “time of war or other emergency in 
international relations”. Thus, Article 73(b)(iii) and 
how it has been interpreted and applied will be the 
focus of the analysis in this article.
4 In the light of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic 
of 2019/2020, Article 73(b)(iii) has gained some 
prominence. This is because some scholars and 
commentators have suggested that states could 
invoke this provision in defence of measures aimed 
at suspending the protection and enforcement of 
intellectual property rights in order to facilitate the 
purchase, importation, or production of diagnostics, 
vaccines, and medicines that they need to address 
the COVID-19 pandemic.8 Therefore, this article 
will also critically consider the extent to which 
states can invoke Article 73(b)(iii) to facilitate 
access to diagnostics, vaccines, and medicines 
during a pandemic such as COVID-19. While the 
discussion in this regard is focused on COVID-19, 
the arguments made here are equally applicable 
to other pandemics that may occur in the future. 
7 See, GATT, Analytical Index: Guide to GATT Law and Practice (1995) 
599-610. See further, Tania Voon, ‘The Security Exception in 
WTO Law: Entering a New Era’ (2019) 113 AJIL Unbound 45.
8 See, South Centre, ‘COVID-19 Pandemic: Access to Preven-
tion and Treatment is a Matter of National and International 
Security: Open Letter from Carlos Correa, Executive Direc-
tor of the South Centre’ (4 April 2020) available at <https://
www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/COVID-
19-Open-Letter-REV.pdf> (urging the Director-Generals of 
the WHO, WIPO, and WTO to “support developing and other 
countries, as they may need, to make use of Article 73(b) of 
the TRIPS Agreement to suspend the enforcement of any 
intellectual property right (including patents, designs and 
trade secrets) that may pose an obstacle to the procurement 
or local manufacturing of the products and devices necessary 
to protect their populations.”); Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, 
‘Access to Covid-19 Treatment and International Intellectual 
Property Protection – Part II: National Security Exceptions 




Nirmalya Syam, ‘Intellectual Property, Innovation and Ac-
cess to Health Products for COVID-19: A Review of Measures 
Taken by Different Countries’, South Centre Policy Brief No. 
80 (June 2020) 4; Frederick Abbott, ‘The TRIPS Agreement 
Article 73 Security Exceptions and the COVID-19 Pandemic’, 
South Centre Research Paper 116, (August 2020).
5 The rest of this article is structured into three 
main sections. Section B will focus on the historical 
approach of states to the security exceptions as 
“self-judging”. In this regard, attention will be paid 
to how the security exceptions were construed in 
the pre-WTO era. Section C will focus on the recent 
jurisprudence emanating from the WTO dispute 
settlement panels regarding the interpretation 
of Article XXI of GATT and Article 73 of the TRIPS 
Agreement.  Attention will also be paid to the 
question of whether states can, in theory, invoke 
Article 73(b)(iii) of the TRIPS Agreement in response 
to pandemics such as COVID-19. Section D will 
thereafter critically assess whether the invocation 
of Article 73(b)(iii) is a realistic option for states in 
the fight against pandemics, especially those states 
that do not possess local manufacturing capacity.
B. The Historical Approach to the 
National Security Exceptions 
in International Trade Law
6 Prior to the adoption of the WTO Agreement that 
created the WTO in 1994, security exceptions 
were contained in Article XXI of GATT 1947 which 
was meant to be part of the Havana Charter for 
an International Trade Organisation that never 
came into force. However, the provisions of GATT 
1947 remained in force provisionally until it was 
incorporated (with some adjustments) into GATT 
1994 which is a component of the current WTO 
Agreement. Thus, the “provisions of the GATT 
1947, incorporated into the GATT 1994, continue 
to have legal effect as part of the GATT 1994, itself 
a component of the WTO Agreement.”9 There was, 
however, no legal interpretation of Article XXI 
of GATT 1947 prior to its transformation into the 
current Article XXI of GATT 1994 although a number 
of states took the view that it was a “self-judging” 
provision.
7 For instance, during the accession of Portugal to 
GATT in 1961, Ghana invoked Article XXI(b)(iii) in 
support of its decision to impose a ban on goods 
entering Ghana from Portugal and it noted that 
“under this Article each contracting party was the 
sole judge of what was necessary in its essential 
security interests.”10 According to Ghana:
9 See, WTO, ‘GATT 1947 and GATT 1994: What’s the Difference?’ 
available at <https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/
legalexplgatt1947_e.htm>
10 GATT, Contracting Parties Nineteenth Session, ‘Summary 





There could therefore be no objection to Ghana regarding 
the boycott of goods as justified by its security interests. It 
might be observed that a country’s security interests may be 
threatened by a potential as well as an actual danger. The 
Ghanaian Government’s view was that the situation in Angola 
was a constant threat to the peace of the African continent 
and that any action which, by bringing pressure to bear on 
the Portuguese Government, might lead to a lessening of 
this danger, was therefore justified in the essential security 
interests of Ghana. There could be no doubt also that the 
policy adhered to by the Government of Portugal in the past 
year had led to an emergency in international relations 
between Portugal and African States.11
8 Also, during the GATT Council discussions in 1982 
of the trade restrictions imposed on Argentina for 
non-economic reasons by the European Economic 
Community (EEC), Canada, and Australia, similar 
sentiments were expressed by these states to justify 
their restrictions against imports from Argentina 
into their territories.12  In this regard, the EEC 
took the view that it had acted on the basis of its 
inherent rights “of which Article XXI of the General 
Agreement was a reflection” and that the “exercise 
of these rights constituted a general exception, 
and required neither notification, justification, 
nor approval” because “every contracting party 
was - in the last resort - the judge of its exercise 
of these rights.”13 Canada contended that “the 
situation which had necessitated the measures had 
to be satisfactorily resolved by appropriate action 
elsewhere, as the GATT had neither the competence 
nor the responsibility to deal with the political issue 
which had been raised.”14 Australia also argued that 
its “measures were in conformity with the provisions 
of Article XXI:(c), which did not require notification 
or justification.”15
9 In addition, apart from taking the view that the 
security exceptions in GATT 1947 were self-judging, 
some states also took the view that the invocation of 
this exception could neither be reviewed by members 
of GATT nor by a dispute settlement panel. Thus, 
after the United States imposed a trade embargo 
against Nicaragua in 1985, a panel was established 
to examine the measures of the United States but 
the terms of reference of the panel precluded it 
from examining the motivation for or the validity 
of the invocation of Article XXI(b)(iii) by the United 
11 Ibid.
12 GATT, Council, ‘Minutes of Meeting’ C/M/157 (22 June 1982).




States. Ultimately, the panel could not provide a 
legal interpretation of Article XXI(b)(iii) and, in a 
report which was not adopted, the panel held in this 
regard that:
The Panel first considered the question of whether any 
benefits accruing to Nicaragua under the General Agreement 
had been nullified or impaired as the result of a failure of the 
United States to carry out its obligations under the General 
Agreement (Article XXIII:1(a)). The Panel noted that, while 
both parties to the dispute agreed that the United States, 
by imposing the embargo, had acted contrary to certain 
trade-facilitating provisions of the General Agreement, they 
disagreed on the question of whether the non-observance of 
these provisions was justified by Article XXI(b)(iii)…
The Panel further noted that, in the view of Nicaragua, this 
provision should be interpreted in the light of the basic 
principles of international law and in harmony with the 
decisions of the United Nations and of the International 
Court of Justice and should therefore be regarded as merely 
providing contracting parties subjected to an aggression 
with a right to self-defence. The Panel also noted that, in the 
view of the United States, Article XXI applied to any action 
which the contracting party taking it considered necessary 
for the protection of its essential security interests and that 
the Panel, both by the terms of Article XXI and by its mandate, 
was precluded from examining the validity of the United 
States’ invocation of Article XXI.
The Panel did not consider the question of whether the terms 
of Article XXI precluded it from examining the validity of the 
United States’ invocation of that Article as this examination 
was precluded by its mandate. It recalled that its terms 
of reference put strict limits on its activities because they 
stipulated that the Panel could not examine or judge the 
validity of or the motivation for the invocation of Article 
XXI:(b)(iii) by the United States (cf. paragraph 1.4 above). 
The Panel concluded that, as it was not authorized to examine 
the justification for the United States’ invocation of a general 
exception to the obligations under the General Agreement, it 
could find the United States neither to be complying with its 
obligations under the General Agreement nor to be failing to 
carry out its obligations under that Agreement.16
10 The above sums up the approach of a number 
of states to the security exceptions in the GATT. 
Essentially, some states took the view that the 
invocation of Article XXI of GATT was a matter 
solely within the scope of the discretion available 
to states under international trade law. Thus, they 
contended that the motivations for invoking any 
of the security exceptions could not be reviewed 
by a dispute settlement panel. As there was no 
legal interpretation of Article XXI, the uncertainty 
 
 
16 United States – Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, Report by 
the Panel, L/6053, (13 October 1986) paras 5.1-5.3.
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surrounding the scope of the security exceptions 
continued until and after the adoption of the WTO 
Agreement in 1994.
C. The Recent Clarification of 
the Scope of Article 73(b)
(iii) and its Applicability in 
the Context of Pandemics
11 The uncertainty surrounding the interpretation and 
scope of the security exceptions continued even after 
the adoption of GATT 1994 and the TRIPS Agreement 
until 2019 when Article XXI(b)(iii) of GATT 1994 
was interpreted and applied by the WTO dispute 
settlement panel in Russia – Measures Concerning 
Traffic in Transit (hereinafter, Russia – Traffic in 
Transit). Moreover, in 2020, Article 73(b)(iii) of the 
TRIPS Agreement which is identical to Article XXI(b)
(iii) of GATT 1994 was also interpreted by a panel 
in Saudi Arabia – Measures Concerning the Protection of 
Intellectual Property Rights (hereinafter, Saudi Arabia 
– Intellectual Property Rights). The decisions of both 
panels will thus be used to analyse the scope of 
Article 73(b)(iii) of the TRIPS Agreement.
12 In Saudi Arabia – Intellectual Property Rights, Saudi 
Arabia invoked the security exception in Article 
73(b)(iii) of the TRIPS Agreement to justify its 
measures that prevented a company headquartered 
in Qatar, beIN, from obtaining Saudi legal counsel 
to enforce its intellectual property rights through 
civil enforcement procedures before Saudi courts 
and tribunals. This violated its obligation under 
Article 42 of the TRIPS Agreement. Saudi Arabia 
also invoked this exception to justify its refusal to 
apply criminal procedures to beoutQ, a company 
subject to its jurisdiction that was engaged in wilful 
copyright piracy on a commercial scale through 
its unauthorised distribution and streaming of 
media content belonging to beIN (in violation of its 
obligation under Article 61 of the TRIPS Agreement).
13 In defining the applicable legal standard in this 
regard, the panel in Saudi Arabia – Intellectual Property 
Rights adopted the analytical framework that was 
developed by the panel in Russia – Traffic in Transit 
in the context of Article XXI(b)(iii) and it listed the 
following four factors that need to be considered in 
this regard:
(a) whether the existence of a “war or other emergency in 
international relations” has been established in the sense 
of subparagraph (iii) to Article 73(b); 
(b) whether the relevant actions were “taken in time of” that 
war or other emergency in international relations; 
(c) whether the invoking Member has articulated its relevant 
“essential security interests” sufficiently to enable an 
assessment of whether there is any link between those 
actions and the protection of its essential security interests; 
and 
(d) whether the relevant actions are so remote from, or 
unrelated to, the “emergency in international relations” as 
to make it implausible that the invoking Member considers 
those actions to be necessary for the protection of its 
essential security interests arising out of the emergency.17 
14 In relation to the first factor, i.e. whether the 
existence of a “war or other emergency in 
international relations” has been established, the 
panel in Russia – Traffic in Transit took the view 
that this should be objectively determined and 
not decided through the subjective discretionary 
determination of the state invoking the exception.18 
Thus, the panel rejected the argument that Article 
XXI(b)(iii) is self-judging and it also rejected Russia’s 
argument that the panel lacks jurisdiction to review 
Russia’s invocation of Article XXI(b)(iii).19 According 
17 Saudi Arabia – Intellectual Property Rights, para 7.242. The panel 
justified its decision to adopt the analytical framework de-
veloped by the panel in Russia – Traffic in Transit in footnote 
752 where it noted that: “Where two sets of exceptions from 
obligations use similar language and requirements and set 
out their provisions in the same manner, the Appellate 
Body has considered prior panel and Appellate Body reports 
concerning the first set of exceptions to be relevant for its 
analysis under a second set of exceptions. (See Appellate 
Body Reports, US – Gambling, para. 291 (finding previous 
decisions under Article XX of the GATT 1994 relevant for 
its analysis under Article XIV of the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS)); and Argentina – Financial Services, 
para. 6.202 (referring to the Appellate Body’s interpretation 
of Article XX(d) of the GATT 1994 in Korea – Various Measures 
on Beef to set out its analytical framework for Article XIV(c) of 
the GATS).)”. Considering the differences between the GATT 
and the TRIPS Agreement, it has been questioned whether the 
panel in Saudi Arabia – Intellectual Property Rights should have 
adopted the analytical framework developed in the context 
of Article XXI of the GATT in its interpretation of Article 73 
of the TRIPS Agreement. In this regard, see Caroline Glöckle, 
‘The Second Chapter on a National Security Exception in WTO 
Law: The Panel Report in Saudi Arabia – Protection of IPR’ 
EJIL: Talk! (22 July 2020) available at < https://www.ejiltalk.
org/the-second-chapter-on-a-national-security-exception-
in-wto-law-the-panel-report-in-saudi-arabia-protection-of-
ipr/>. See further, Susy Frankel, ‘The Applicability of GATT 
Jurisprudence to the Interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement’ 
in Carlos Correa (ed.), Research Handbook on the Interpretation 
and Enforcement of Intellectual Property under WTO Rules (Edward 
Elgar, 2010) 3-23.
18 Russia – Traffic in Transit, paras 7.71, 7.100.




to the panel, the clause “which it considers” in 
the chapeau of Article XXI(b) “does not extend to 
the determination of the circumstances in each 
subparagraph” listed in Article XXI(b).20 This makes 
it clear that the determination of the existence of a 
war or other emergency in international relations is 
not within the discretion available to states in this 
regard.
15 The panel in Russia – Traffic in Transit arrived at this 
conclusion for a number of reasons. According to 
the panel, “the three sets of circumstances under 
subparagraphs (i) to (iii) of Article XXI(b) operate 
as limitative qualifying clauses; in other words, 
they qualify and limit the exercise of the discretion 
accorded to Members under the chapeau to these 
circumstances.”21 The panel also examined the 
negotiating history of Article XXI of GATT 1947 and it 
concluded in this regard that the drafters considered 
that:
(a) the matters later reflected in Article XX and Article 
XXI of the GATT 1947 were considered to have a 
different character, as evident from their separation 
into two articles; 
(b) the “balance” that was struck by the security 
exceptions was that Members would have “some 
latitude” to determine what their essential security 
interests are, and the necessity of action to protect 
those interests, while potential abuse of the exceptions 
would be curtailed by limiting the circumstances 
in which the exceptions could be invoked to those 
specified in the subparagraphs of Article XXI(b); and 
(c) in the light of this balance, the security exceptions 
would remain subject to the consultations and 
dispute settlement provisions set forth elsewhere in 
the Charter.22 
16 The panel thus concluded in this regard that “there 
is no basis for treating the invocation of Article 
XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994 as an incantation that 
shields a challenged measure from all scrutiny.”23 
20 Ibid para 7.101. See also, ibid para 7.82 (holding that, “the 
ordinary meaning of Article XXI(b)(iii), in its context and in 
light of the object and purpose of the GATT 1994 and the WTO 
Agreement more generally, is that the adjectival clause “which 
it considers” in the chapeau of Article XXI(b) does not qualify 
the determination of the circumstances in subparagraph (iii). 
Rather, for action to fall within the scope of Article XXI(b), it 
must objectively be found to meet the requirements in one 
of the enumerated subparagraphs of that provision.”).
21 Ibid para 7.65.
22 Ibid para 7.98.
23 Ibid para 7.100.
With regard to the term “emergency in international 
relations”, the panel observed that: 
the reference to “war” in conjunction with “or other 
emergency in international relations” in subparagraph (iii), 
and the interests that generally arise during war, and from 
the matters addressed in subparagraphs (i) and (ii), suggest 
that political or economic differences between Members are 
not sufficient, of themselves, to constitute an emergency in 
international relations for purposes of subparagraph (iii). 
Indeed, it is normal to expect that Members will, from time 
to time, encounter political or economic conflicts with other 
Members or states. While such conflicts could sometimes be 
considered urgent or serious in a political sense, they will 
not be “emergencies in international relations” within the 
meaning of subparagraph (iii) unless they give rise to defence 
and military interests, or maintenance of law and public order 
interests. 
An emergency in international relations would, therefore, 
appear to refer generally to a situation of armed conflict, or 
of latent armed conflict, or of heightened tension or crisis, 
or of general instability engulfing or surrounding a state. 
Such situations give rise to particular types of interests for 
the Member in question, i.e. defence or military interests, or 
maintenance of law and public order interests.24
17 In Saudi Arabia – Intellectual Property Rights, the panel 
held that there was a situation of heightened tension 
or crisis which is related to Saudi Arabia’s defence or 
military interests or maintenance of law and public 
order interests sufficient to establish an emergency 
in international relations that has persisted since 
5 June 2017.25 The panel arrived at this conclusion 
for a number of reasons including, inter alia, the 
fact that Saudi Arabia severed diplomatic and 
economic ties with Qatar in 5 June 2017.26 According 
to the panel, the severance of all diplomatic and 
economic ties could be considered as “the ultimate 
State expression of the existence of an emergency 
in international relations.”27 The panel also 
supported its conclusion in this regard by referring 
to Saudi Arabia’s accusation against Qatar that 
the latter is supporting terrorism and extremism. 
As the panel pointed out, “when a group of States 
repeatedly accuses anotherof supporting terrorism 
and extremism … that in and of itself reflects and 
contributes to a “situation … of heightened tension 
or crisis” between them that relates to their security 
interests.”28
24 Ibid paras 7.75-7.76.
25 Saudi Arabia – Intellectual Property Rights, para 7.257.
26 Ibid paras 7.258-7.262.
27 Ibid para 7.259.
28 Ibid para 7.263.
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18 The analysis of the term “emergency in international 
relations” in Russia – Traffic in Transit clearly excludes 
political or economic conflicts between states. The 
panel’s approach in this regard seems to situate the 
term “emergency in international relations” in the 
context of armed conflict and it is therefore unclear 
whether it includes a pandemic such as COVID-
19.29 Nevertheless, one could argue that where a 
pandemic affects the ability of a state to maintain 
law and public order, then (at least for that state) 
it could be deemed an “emergency in international 
relations”.30
19 Concerning the second factor, i.e. that the relevant 
actions be “taken in time of” war or other emergency 
in international relations, the panel in Russia – 
Traffic in Transit took the view that this meant that 
the relevant actions must be taken during the war 
or other emergency in international relations.31 
The panel further held that this “chronological 
occurrence is also an objective fact, amenable to 
objective determination.”32 In other words, this is 
also not within the discretion available to states in 
this regard. 
20 In Saudi Arabia – Intellectual Property Rights, the 
panel took the view that the two actions that 
needed to be examined in this regard (i.e. measures 
preventing beIN from obtaining Saudi legal counsel 
to enforce its intellectual property rights through 
civil enforcement procedures before Saudi courts 
and tribunals, and the refusal to provide criminal 
procedures to be applied to beoutQ) were “taken in 
time of” the emergency in international relations 
29 See, Russia – Traffic in Transit, para 7.99 (noting that, “The Panel 
is also mindful that the negotiations on the ITO Charter and the 
GATT 1947 occurred very shortly after the end of the Second 
World War. The discussions of “security” issues throughout 
the negotiating history should therefore be understood in 
that context.”). 
30 See also, Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, ‘Access to Covid-19 
Treatment and International Intellectual Property Protec-
tion – Part II: National Security Exceptions and Test Data 
Protection’ EJIL:Talk! (15 April 2020) (contending that: “…
the severity of the Covid19 pandemic and its far-reaching 
consequences across the globe, plus the clarifications under 
para.5c) of the Doha Declaration that ‘public health crises, 
including (…) epidemics’ can represent a ‘national emergency’, 
arguably support an application of Article 73(b)(iii) TRIPS … 
a WHO declared pandemic should constitute an international 
emergency, especially if accompanied with general economic, 
social and political instabilities”).
31 Russia – Traffic in Transit, para 7.70.
32 Ibid.
that has persisted since at least 5 June 2017.33  In 
relation to COVID-19, measures taken during the 
pandemic should arguably fall within the scope of 
this exception.
21 With regard to the third factor, i.e. whether the 
invoking Member has articulated its relevant 
“essential security interests” sufficiently to enable 
an assessment of whether there is any link between 
those actions and the protection of its essential 
security interests, the panel in Russia – Traffic in 
Transit began its analysis by drawing a distinction 
between “security interests” and “essential security 
interests”. According to the panel: 
“Essential security interests”, which is evidently a 
narrower concept than “security interests”, may generally 
be understood to refer to those interests relating to the 
quintessential functions of the state, namely, the protection 
of its territory and its population from external threats, and 
the maintenance of law and public order internally.34
22 The panel clarified that the articulation of the 
essential security interests that are directly relevant 
to the protection of a state from external or internal 
threats is subjective. According to the panel:
The specific interests that are considered directly relevant to 
the protection of a state from such external or internal threats 
will depend on the particular situation and perceptions of the 
state in question, and can be expected to vary with changing 
circumstances. For these reasons, it is left, in general, to every 
Member to define what it considers to be its essential security 
interests.35 
23 In other words, the articulation of essential security 
interests falls within the discretion available to 
states in this regard. However, the panel stressed 
that this does not imply that states have the freedom 
to elevate any concern to that of an essential security 
interest and it noted that the freedom available 
to states in this regard is circumscribed by their 
obligation to interpret and apply Article XXI(b)(iii) 
in good faith. As the panel notes in this regard: 
33 Saudi Arabia – Intellectual Property Rights, para 7.269 (noting 
that, “The measures at issue are of a continuing nature, as 
opposed to acts or omissions that occurred or were completed 
on a particular date, and neither party has suggested that 
the Panel must assign any dates to them for the purposes 
of examining the claims and defences before the Panel. In 
the Panel’s view, it suffices to note that beoutQ did not com-
mence operations until August 2017, and hence the actions 
to be examined under the chapeau were “taken in time of” 
the “emergency in international relations” that has persisted 
since at least 5 June 2017.”).
34 Russia – Traffic in Transit, para 7.130.




…this does not mean that a Member is free to elevate any 
concern to that of an “essential security interest”. Rather, 
the discretion of a Member to designate particular concerns 
as “essential security interests” is limited by its obligation 
to interpret and apply Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994 
in good faith. The Panel recalls that the obligation of good 
faith is a general principle of law and a principle of general 
international law which underlies all treaties, as codified in 
Article 31(1) (“[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith …”) 
and Article 26 (“[e]very treaty … must be performed [by the 
parties] in good faith”) of the Vienna Convention.
The obligation of good faith requires that Members not 
use the exceptions in Article XXI as a means to circumvent 
their obligations under the GATT 1994. A glaring example of 
this would be where a Member sought to release itself from 
the structure of “reciprocal and mutually advantageous 
arrangements” that constitutes the multilateral trading 
system simply by re-labelling trade interests that it had 
agreed to protect and promote within the system, as “essential 
security interests”, falling outside the reach of that system. 
It is therefore incumbent on the invoking Member to 
articulate the essential security interests said to arise from 
the emergency in international relations sufficiently enough 
to demonstrate their veracity.36 
24 In Saudi Arabia – Intellectual Property Rights, the panel 
held that Saudi Arabia had expressly articulated its 
essential security interests in terms of protecting 
itself from the dangers of terrorism and extremism.37 
The panel further noted that the interests identified 
by Saudi Arabia clearly relate to the quintessential 
functions of the state, i.e. “the protection of its 
territory and its population from external threats, 
and the maintenance of law and public order 
internally”.38 The panel equally observed that the 
standard that is applied to the articulation of essential 
security interests is whether this articulation is 
“minimally satisfactory” in the circumstances and 
it is not necessary to demand greater precision from 
the invoking state.39 According to the panel:
Although Qatar argued that Saudi Arabia’s formulations of 
its essential security interests are “vague” or “imprecise”, 
the Panel sees no basis in the text of Article 73(b)(iii), or 
otherwise, for demanding greater precision than that which 
has been presented by Saudi Arabia. The Panel recalls that, 
in Russia – Traffic in Transit, the standard applied to the 
invoking Member was whether its articulation of its essential 
security interests was “minimally satisfactory” in the 
circumstances. The requirement that an invoking Member 
36 Ibid paras 7.132-7.134.
37 Saudi Arabia – Intellectual Property Rights, para 7.280.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid para 7.281.
articulate its “essential security interests” sufficiently to 
enable an assessment of whether the challenged measures 
are related to those interests is not a particularly onerous 
one, and is appropriately subject to limited review by a panel. 
The reason is that this analytical step serves primarily to 
provide a benchmark against which to examine the “action” 
under the chapeau of Article 73(b). That is, this analytical 
step enables an assessment by the Panel of whether either of 
the challenged measures found to be inconsistent with the 
TRIPS Agreement is plausibly connected to the protection of 
those essential security interests.40 
25 Indeed, in a footnote, the panel further stated 
that, “[a]mong other things, it may be noted that 
an assessment of whether or not certain security 
interests are “essential” or not is not one that a 
WTO dispute settlement panel is well positioned to 
make.”41 Thus, with regard to the pandemic caused 
by COVID-19, it will be up to any state that wants to 
invoke Article 73(b)(iii) to articulate in good faith its 
essential security interests in this regard which may 
relate to its need to maintain law and order within 
its territory during the pandemic.
26 In relation to the fourth and final factor, i.e. whether 
the relevant actions are so remote from, or unrelated 
to, the “emergency in international relations” as 
to make it implausible that the invoking Member 
considers those actions to be necessary for the 
protection of its essential security interests arising 
out of the emergency, the panel in Russia – Traffic in 
Transit adopted a standard based on the minimum 
requirement of plausibility.42 This requires that the 
measures in question must not be so remote from, 
or unrelated to the emergency that it is implausible 
that the state implemented the measures for the 
protection of its essential security interests arising 
out of the emergency.43
40 Ibid citing Russia – Traffic in Transit, para 7.137.
41 Saudi Arabia – Intellectual Property Rights, para 7.281, footnote 
826.
42 Russia – Traffic in Transit, para 7.138 (stating that, “The obliga-
tion of good faith, referred to in paragraphs 7.132 and 7.133 
above, applies not only to the Member’s definition of the 
essential security interests said to arise from the particular 
emergency in international relations, but also, and most 
importantly, to their connection with the measures at issue. 
Thus, as concerns the application of Article XXI(b)(iii), this 
obligation is crystallized in demanding that the measures at 
issue meet a minimum requirement of plausibility in relation 
to the proffered essential security interests, i.e. that they are 
not implausible as measures protective of these interests.”). 
43 Ibid para 7.139.
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27 In Saudi Arabia – Intellectual Property Rights, with regard 
to the measures preventing beIN from obtaining 
Saudi legal counsel to enforce its intellectual property 
rights through civil enforcement procedures, the 
panel held that these “anti-sympathy” measures 
meet a minimum requirement of plausibility 
in relation to the articulated essential security 
interests.44 According to the panel in this regard:
The measures aimed at denying Qatari nationals access to civil 
remedies through Saudi courts may be viewed as an aspect 
of Saudi Arabia’s umbrella policy of ending or preventing 
any form of interaction with Qatari nationals. Given that 
Saudi Arabia imposed a travel ban on all Qatari nationals 
from entering the territory of Saudi Arabia and an expulsion 
order for all Qatari nationals in the territory of Saudi Arabia 
as part of the comprehensive measures taken on 5 June 2017, 
it is not implausible that Saudi Arabia might take other 
measures to prevent Qatari nationals from having access 
to courts, tribunals and other institutions in Saudi Arabia. 
Indeed, it is not implausible that, as part of its umbrella policy 
of ending or preventing any form of interaction with Qatari 
nationals, as reflected through, inter alia, its 5 June 2017 travel 
ban intended to “prevent[] Qatari citizens’ entry to or transit 
through the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia”, which forms part 
of Saudi Arabia’s “comprehensive measures”, Saudi Arabia 
might take various formal and informal measures to deny 
Saudi law firms from representing or interacting with Qatari 
nationals for almost any purpose.45
28 The panel however held that Saudi Arabia’s non-
application of criminal procedures to beoutQ did not 
meet the minimum requirement of plausibility. In 
this regard, the panel observed that:
In contrast to the anti-sympathy measures, which might 
be viewed as an aspect of Saudi Arabia’s umbrella policy of 
ending or preventing any form of interaction with Qatari 
nationals, the Panel is unable to discern any basis for 
concluding that the application of criminal procedures or 
penalties to beoutQ would require any entity in Saudi Arabia 
to engage in any form of interaction with beIN or any other 
Qatari national.46
29 Importantly, the panel noted that the non-
application of criminal procedures to beoutQ was 
affecting not only Qatar or Qatari nationals, “but 
also a range of third-party right holders” from 
other countries.47 The panel therefore concluded 
in this regard that there is “no rational or logical 
connection between the comprehensive measures 
aimed at ending interaction with Qatar and Qatari 
44 Saudi Arabia – Intellectual Property Rights, paras 7.286-7.288.
45 Ibid para 7.286.
46 Ibid para 7.289.
47 Ibid para 7.291.
nationals, and the non-application of Saudi criminal 
procedures and penalties to beoutQ.”48
30 Concerning the COVID-19 pandemic, a state invoking 
Article 73(b)(iii) in defence of its decision to suspend 
the protection and enforcement of intellectual 
property rights would have to demonstrate that the 
measures it is implementing are not remote from 
or unrelated to the emergency. Thus, where a state 
suspends the protection and enforcement of patent 
rights to facilitate the local production of vaccines or 
medicines for treating COVID-19, this could arguably 
be held to be related to the COVID-19 pandemic and 
therefore related to the emergency. Therefore, in 
theory, the invocation of the security exception 
in response to the COVID-19 pandemic can satisfy 
all the four factors identified by the panels in both 
Russia – Traffic in Transit and Saudi Arabia – Intellectual 
Property Rights.
D. Article 73(b)(iii) of the TRIPS 
Agreement and Pandemics: 
A Realistic Assessment
31 While it may be possible, at least in theory, for states 
to invoke Article 73(b)(iii) of the TRIPS Agreement 
in response to pandemics such as COVID-19, it is 
contended here that this is not a realistic option 
for a number of states. In this regard, there are at 
least two reasons why Article 73(b)(iii) of the TRIPS 
Agreement is not a realistic option for some states. 
These reasons are further explored below.
32 First, regarding the production of patented medicines 
or vaccines, only states that possess the capacity to 
manufacture pharmaceutical products domestically 
can arguably invoke Article 73(b)(iii) to justify the 
suspension of the protection and enforcement of 
patent rights to protect their essential security 
interests during a pandemic such as COVID-19. 
Invoking Article 73(b)(iii) may thus be unhelpful to 
countries that cannot produce the needed vaccines 
or medicines domestically. Besides the fact that 
only some developed and developing countries can 
actually produce vaccines, several developing and 
least-developed countries do not even possess the 
capacity to produce medicines.49
48 Ibid para 7.292.
49 See, Zoheir Ezziane, ‘Essential Drugs Production in Brazil, 
Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS): Opportunities 
and Challenges’ (2014) 3(7) International Journal of Health Policy 
and Management 365; UNCTAD, ‘COVID-19 Heightens Need 
for Pharmaceutical Production in Poor Countries’ (27 May 
2020) available at < https://unctad.org/en/pages/newsde-




33 Second, in relation to the importation of patented 
medicines or vaccines, the security exception in 
Article 73(b)(iii) cannot be used to circumvent 
the problems associated with the waiver system 
contained in Article 31bis of the TRIPS Agreement.50 
Article 31bis waives the obligation contained in 
Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement51 where a state 
grants a compulsory licence for the production 
of a pharmaceutical product and its export to an 
eligible importing country. The usefulness of the 
waiver mechanism in Article 31bis, however, remains 
doubtful as it contains a number of complex and 
cumbersome requirements and this has meant that 
it has been used only once to export anti-retroviral 
drugs from Canada to Rwanda.52 In this regard, the 
it is worth noting that China, India, and Russia have been 
able to produce some vaccines. See, BBC, ‘COVID: What do 
we know about China’s Coronavirus Vaccines?’ (14 January 
2021) available at <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
asia-china-55212787>; Kamala Thiagarajan, ‘COVID-19: India 
is at Centre of Global Vaccine Manufacturing, But Opacity 
Threatens Public Trust’ The BMJ (28 January 2021) available 
at <https://www.bmj.com/content/bmj/372/bmj.n196.full.
pdf>; Rachel Schraer, ‘Russia’s Sputnik V Vaccine has 92% Ef-
ficacy in Trial’ BBC News (2 February 2021) available at https://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-55900622; Ian Jones and Polly 
Roy, ‘Sputnik V COVID-19 Vaccine Candidate Appears Safe 
and Effective’ (2021) 397 The Lancet 642-643.
50 Cf. Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, ‘Access to Covid-19 Treatment 
and International Intellectual Property Protection – Part 
II: National Security Exceptions and Test Data Protection’ 
EJIL:Talk! (15 April 2020) (querying whether “a WTO Member 
that (for whatever reason) cannot use the Article 31bis sys-
tem [can] alternatively rely on Article 73 [by] arguing that 
importing Covid19 treatment to address its own insufficient 
manufacturing capacity is ‘necessary’ for protecting its ‘es-
sential security interests’”).
51 Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement provides that compulsory 
licences and government use must be authorised “predomi-
nantly for the supply of the domestic market”.
52 See, UN Secretary General’s High-Level Panel on Access to 
Medicines, ‘Report of the United Nations Secretary-General’s 
High Level Panel on Access to Medicines: Promoting In-
novation and Access to Health Technologies’ (September 
2016) 23 (noting that, “There are differing opinions as to 
why the “Paragraph 6 decision” has only been used once in 
13 years. Some note that multilateral health financing has 
removed the need for resource-constrained countries to use 
it. Others argue that it is too complex to be used. The only 
time the mechanism was used, it proved to be complex and 
cumbersome and serious questions remain as to its effective-
ness.”). See also, Muhammad Zaheer Abbas and Shamreeza 
Riaz, ‘Compulsory Licensing and Access to Medicines: TRIPS 
Amendment Allows Export to Least-Developed Countries’ 
(2017) 12(6) Journal of Intellectual Property Law and Practice 451, 
452 (observing that, “the effectiveness of Article 31bis is likely 
key point is that, Article 73(b)(iii) is specifically 
designed to enable the state invoking the exception 
to take measures to protect its own essential security 
interests during an emergency and therefore, it 
cannot be used to address the essential security 
interests of another state and thereby avoid the 
strict and cumbersome requirements associated with 
Article 31bis of the TRIPS Agreement. This is not to 
suggest that Article 73 is subject to either Article 31 
or Article 31bis but rather to emphasise the limited 
scope of Article 73(b)(iii) of the TRIPS Agreement. 
This further complicates the situation for countries 
that do not possess domestic manufacturing capacity 
to produce medicines and vaccines. 
34 Thus, to provide an illustration, State A cannot 
invoke the security exception in Article 73(b)(iii) 
to justify a decision to suspend the protection and 
enforcement of patent rights in its territory to 
produce and export patented medicines or vaccines 
into the territory of State B. As interpreted by the 
panel in Russia – Traffic in Transit and in Saudi Arabia – 
Intellectual Property Rights, the measures implemented 
by State A pursuant to Article 73(b)(iii) must not 
be remote from or unrelated to the emergency 
that it is implausible that State A implemented the 
measures for the protection of its own essential 
security interests arising out of the emergency. 
In other words, it is doubtful whether State A can 
invoke Article 73(b)(iii) to justify the suspension of 
the protection and enforcement of patent rights in 
its own territory in order to protect the essential 
to be hindered by the tedious and unnecessarily cumbersome 
authorization processes. Procedural details and formalities 
may discourage the generic drug manufacturers from exploit-
ing this provision … As of February 2017, the waiver flexibility 
has been used only once. This demonstrates that it did not 
provide a workable solution to the problem highlighted in 
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration. Making this flexibility a 
permanent solution, without making changes to address the 
above-mentioned concerns, is unlikely to have any substantial 
practical significance.”); Carlos Correa, ‘Will the Amendment 
to the TRIPS Agreement Enhance Access to Medicines?’ Policy 
Brief No. 57, South Centre (January 2019) 3 (noting that, “The 
required notifications and the nature of the information 
required – plus the obligation to adopt measures to avoid 
the ‘diversion’ of the products to other countries – would 
seem more suitable for the export of weapons or dangerous 
materials than for products to address public health needs.”); 
Nicholas Vincent, ‘TRIP-ing Up: The Failure of TRIPS Article 
31bis’ (2020) 24(1) Gonzaga Journal of International Law 1. It 
should be noted that Bolivia recently notified the WTO that 
it needs to import COVID-19 vaccines via Article 31bis of the 
TRIPS Agreement. If Bolivia is successful, then this would be 
the second instance where Article 31bis has been used by a 
WTO member. See, WTO, ‘Bolivia Outlines Vaccine Import 
Needs in use of WTO Flexibilities to tackle Pandemic’ (12 May 
2021) available at  <https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/
news21_e/dgno_10may21_e.htm> 
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security interests of State B by exporting patented 
medicines or vaccines from State A into State B. 
35 Therefore, even if one can successfully argue that 
the COVID-19 pandemic should be classified as “an 
emergency in international relations”, invoking 
Article 73(b)(iii) may be unhelpful to a number of 
developing and least-developed countries that do 
not possess domestic manufacturing capacity to 
produce pharmaceutical products. Besides, least-
developed countries are currently exempted from 
providing patent protection for pharmaceutical 
products until 2033.53 Thus, it is unnecessary for 
least-developed countries to invoke Article 73(b)
(iii) in order to implement measures to suspend the 
protection and enforcement of patent protection for 
pharmaceutical products.
E. Conclusion
36 It is now clear that the invocation of the security 
exceptions in Article 73 of the TRIPS Agreement is 
not self-judging and non-justiciable. Importantly, 
the determination of whether there is an emergency 
in international relations pursuant to Article 73(b)
(iii) of the TRIPS Agreement is an objective fact that is 
amenable to objective determination. Nevertheless, 
the articulation of the essential security interests 
for which protection is being sought falls within 
the discretion available to the invoking state in this 
regard although this has to be done in good faith. 
37 Crucially, the panels in both Russia – Traffic in Transit 
and Saudi Arabia – Intellectual Property Rights arguably 
struck the right balance between respecting the 
principle of territoriality and the sovereignty 
of states in terms of protecting their essential 
security interests on the one hand and ensuring 
that states do not abuse and misuse the security 
exception as a means for avoiding their obligations 
under international trade law and international 
intellectual property law on the other hand.54 
53 See, WTO Council for TRIPS, ‘Extension of the Transition 
Period under Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement for Least 
Developed Country Members for Certain Obligations with 
Respect to Pharmaceutical Products’, Decision of the Council 
for TRIPS of 6 November 2015, IP/C/73 (6 November 2015).
54 The approach of the panels also reflects the intention of the 
drafters of Article XXI of GATT 1947. See, UN Economic and 
Social Council, ‘Second Session of the Preparatory Committee 
of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment’ 
Verbatim Report, Thirty-Third Meeting of Commission A, E/
PC/T/A/PV/33, (24 July 1947) 20-21. See also, GATT, Analytical 
Index: Guide to GATT Law and Practice (1995) 600.
38 Moreover, even if a pandemic such as COVID-19 
can be regarded as an emergency in international 
relations, it is doubtful if suspending the protection 
and enforcement of patent rights would really be 
helpful to countries with no capacity to domestically 
produce pharmaceutical products. Thus, Article 
73(b)(iii) of the TRIPS Agreement may not be helpful 
in addressing the needs of the poorest countries 
even during a pandemic.55 Crucially, this shows that, 
in the absence of domestic manufacturing capacity, 
most of the flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement 
(including the most extreme one, i.e. the national 
security exception) may not be useful to some 
countries. Importantly, it also demonstrates the 
point that facilitating access to medicines in some 
situations may require measures that (include but 
also) transcend intellectual property rights.56
55 See also, UNCTAD-ICTSD, Resource Book on TRIPS and Development 
(CUP, 2005) 809 (noting that, “The rare recourse to security 
exceptions in the context of international economic rela-
tions illustrates the limited importance of such exception for 
developing countries. The problems these countries will face 
in the intellectual property area are usually of an economic 
and a social nature, rather than security-related.”); Carlos 
Correa, ‘Lessons from COVID-19: Pharmaceutical Produc-
tion as a Strategic Goal’ SouthViews No. 202 (17 July 2020) 
1 available at <https://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/
uploads/2020/07/SouthViews-Correa.pdf> (observing that: 
“The strategic importance of a local pharmaceutical industry 
has been growingly recognized as a result of the COVID-19 
crisis. Developing countries should take advantage of this 
opportunity to strengthen their pharmaceutical industry, 
including biological medicines. Industrial policies would 
need to be reformulated under an integrated approach so as 
to expand value added & create jobs while addressing public 
health needs. South-South cooperation may also play an 
important role in increasing the contribution of developing 
countries to the global production of pharmaceuticals.”).
56 As Correa notes, “Taking advantage of these opportunities to 
strengthen a pharmaceutical/ biotechnology industry may 
require the reformulation of industrial policies, so as to pro-
mote with an integrated approach this sector as a generator 
of value added, employment and foreign exchange, as well 
as an instrument for achieving health autonomy to address 
public health needs. Such an integrated approach implies 
the deployment of a series of well articulated instruments … 
These instruments include, among others, fiscal measures, 
access to financing, support to research and development 
(R&D) including of an experimental nature, a regulatory 
framework that does not create undue obstacles to registration 
(especially for biosimilars), an intellectual property regime 
that uses the flexibilities of the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) such as com-
pulsory licensing, and a policy of government procurement 
that provides predictability to local demand.” See, Carlos 
Correa, ‘Lessons from COVID-19: Pharmaceutical Production 
as a Strategic Goal’ SouthViews No. 202 (17 July 2020) 3.
